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In 1878 the liberal parties lost enough votes to loose the majority in the parliament which they 
had defended in the general election just one year before. In this paper, the question of where the 
voters came from and why the voting changed so crucially within one year are re-examined. The 
analysis uses a new set of data aggregated at a lower level than those examined by previous stud-
ies and makes use of King’s Algorithm, a tool provided by modern political science. The main 
finding of this paper is that the change towards protectionism was not caused by new, but by 
floating voters from the agricultural sector. 
JEL classification: C11, D78, H83, N43 
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1.   Introduction 
Scholars have always seen the years 1878 and 1879 as ‘the greatest internal revolution in the 
modern history of Imperial Germany’ (Oncken, 1910, 302). During these years, Otto von Bis-
marck, Prime Minister of Prussia and Chancellor of the newly founded Reich, dismissed his 
former liberal partners and forged a new alliance with the conservative forces in the imperial 
parliament. While this move has occasionally been overrated, with some historians calling it a 
‘second foundation of the Reich’ (Böhme 1968; 1972; Barkin 1987), there is no doubt that it set 
a new strategic direction (Nipperdey 1992/98, 382 ff.; Wehler 1995, 934). From the point of 
view of commercial policy, the shift from free trade to protection for agricultural and industrial 
products, which was part of Bismarck’s change of policies, is most important: while it con-
formed to a general trend in European commercial policies, Germany was one of the first coun-
tries to implement it in practice. The empire was at the forefront of what would become a large-
scale set-back for globalisation in the period before World War I.  
The question as to why this fundamental change occurred has been viewed from diverse angles 
(they are surveyed by Gourevitch 1977/98, 707-716). Hans-Ulrich Wehler (1973/85) and Otto 
Pflanze (1990, 449-488) have pointed out that in contrast to the member states of the Reich, 
whose finances were based on tax revenues, the Reich itself had a relatively small income from 
taxes. They suggest that Bismarck intended to introduce tariffs in order to increase his financial 
leeway by netting profits from customs revenues. That way he could improve the Reich’s Fi-
nances, increase its independence from the states, and get rid of the liberals, whom he detested. 
Regardless of which motive dominated the Chancellor’s decision, to pursue his plans he first 
needed a co-operative majority in parliament. Given his well-known political preferences, this 
had to be a conservative majority. 
Bismarck took advantage of two attempts on the Kaiser’s life and concentrated his electoral 
campaign on attacking the Social Democrats, thereby trying to draw attention away from the tar-
iff issue. Bismarck’s antisocialist campaign failed, however, and the tariff issue remained the 
first point on the agenda for the election of 1878.. Helmut Böhme’s (1972, 446-8) terming that 
election ‘protectionist election’ seems appropriate. Trade policy was the issue which polarised 
the political parties of the Reich, with free-traders forming one bloc and protectionists another.  
The 1878 election brought Bismarck the changes he desired and allowed him to introduce high 
tariffs on agricultural and industrial products: The free trade liberals, who had a majority in the 
Reichstag (the German parliament), in 1877, lost 45 seats in 1878 to the advantage of protection-
ist parties. 
The questions which this paper seeks to answer are: Where did the votes for protection come 
from? Were voters who objected to free trade new voters, or did they change their political alle-
giance? Which economic sectors were they in and can voting behaviour be explained by apply-
ing economic theory, and thus be considered as being rational?  3 
My answers to these questions will differ in several aspects from prior research, both in terms of 
the methodology used and the data employed in the analysis. Up to now, most research on the 
link between German elections and trade policies has made use of standard econometric tools, 
such as logistic models and multivariate regressions. But since the 1990s political scientists have 
begun to use a more suitable approach, King’s Algorithm (1997), to analyse modern elections. It 
provides estimates of the voting behaviour of different groups of voters, by first determining 
bounds for the distribution of votes and then by applying a Monte Carlo simulation, in order to 
estimate the average number of votes for particular parties among certain groups. By providing 
point estimates and confidence intervals for the votes of different groups of voters for every con-
stituency, it extracts much more information from the available data than simpler methods and is, 
therefore, preferable to older approaches. King’s algorithm also provides a solution to the so-
called problem of ecological inference. This problem, which I discuss more extensively below, 
appears when one tries to draw inferences about the motives of individuals – such as voters – on 
the basis of aggregate data that apply to whole populations – such as election results.
2As for the 
data, it is striking that most previous research is based on data aggregated not at the level of con-
stituencies, but of larger administrative units: the ‘Regierungsbezirke’. The implicit or explicit 
assumption is that the necessary data do not exist at the level of constituencies. In fact, however, 
most data from the census of 1882, published in the Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, new series 
vol. 2, were compiled at the ‘Kreise’ level (the basic administrative unit above the level of parish 
or township, and a component of constituencies, which were larger than ‘Kreise’). This makes it 
possible either to aggregate data or to approximate the values at the level of constituencies. Thus, 
with minor adjustments, the census data can be used to analyse the elections at the end of the 
1870s. In the process, the the number of observations rises from 68 (based on larger administra-
tive units) to 397 (based on constituencies). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. After briefly discussing the tariff debate and the exist-
ing literature, I will summarize the voting system of Imperial Germany and thenexamine the in-
terests of different groups of voters . Next I explain the problem of ecological inference, discuss 
the data and present the results of an analysis using King’s Algorithm. The next step is to probe 
the motives of the critical agricultural voters by using the estimated votes for protection as a de-
pendent variable in a second stage regression.  The paper concludes by summarizing the implica-
tions of the results for German history and the growth of protectionism in the late nineteenth-
century Europe. 
2.   The Politics of Tariff Reform  
At the end of the 1870s, parties in Germany formed two blocs: the conservatives and the Centre 
being protectionist, and the others being in favour of free trade. Several liberal parties (German 
                                        
2   King (2008) uses his own technique, somewhat modified, in order to analyse the last election in the Weimar 
republic before Hitler took over. 
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People’s Party, National Liberals, Liberals and Progressives) existed side by side, all supporting 
free trade. (Nipperdey 1992/98, 326). The Social Democrats, whose position on free trade was 
somewhat ambiguous during the first decade of the Empire. Toward the end of the 1870s, how-
ever, the party press warned workers not to vote for protectionist parties (Schröder 1910, 570 f.). 
The Catholic Centre Party , having been branded as ‘anti-national’ by Bismarck during the so-
called ‘Kulturkampf’-period from 1871-78 (when the Chancellor tried to strengthen the secular 
state and to reduce the influence of the Catholic Church by imposing sanctions on Catholics), 
saw a chance to gain influence by supporting the Chancellor on issues of commercial policy. 
When the ‘Kulturkampf’ abated, the Centre accordingly came out in favour of protectionism 
(Nipperdey 1992/98, 401). The conservatives, although split between two parties, Conservatives 
and Free Conservatives, were closely linked with agrarian protectionist pressure groups and ad-
vocated protective tariffs (Nipperdey 1992/98, 333 f.). Finally, there were a number of parties 
that represented ethnic minorities, among which the Poles were the most important. In parlia-
ment, the Polish Party, whose stronghold was the Prussian province of Posen, regularly voted in 
favour of free trade (Schonhardt-Bailey 1998, 308). 
Table 1 shows the results of the general elections in 1877 and 1878. In 1877, the free trade liber-
als still had a majority, which they lost to protectionist in 1878: The free trade supporting parties 
lost 10.9 percentage points of seats, while the parties that promoted protectionism gained 9.9 
percentage points. With 53 percent of the seats, the protectionists now constituted the majority. 
Table 1: German general election results 1877 and 1878 













Conservatives  40  10.1   59   14.9   
















Centre  93  23.4   94   23.7   
Total Protectionists  171   43.1   210   53.0   
German People’s Party  4 1 . 0  3  0 . 8    
National Liberals  128  32.2   99   24.9   
Liberals  13  3.3   10   2.5   
Progressives  35  8.8   26   6.6   














Poles  14  3.5   14   3.8   
Total Free Traders   206   51.8   161   40.9   
Others   20  5.1   26   6.6   
Total  397   100  397  100   
 
Source: Ritter and Niehuss (1980). 
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Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of free traders and protectionists after the general 
election in 1878. The darker shaded areas show the protectionist majority and the lighter areas 
the ones with a free trade majority. It also shows the constituencies that changed from a protec-
tionist majority to a free trade majority and vice versa. Free-traders lost votes all over Germany, 
although they suffered the greatest losses in East Prussia, which in 1877 had been fairly evenly 
divided between free-traders and protectionists. 







Protectionist majority, liberal in 1877
Free trade majority, protectionist in 1877 
 
Note: the map shows the results of the general election for all constituencies of the German Kaiserreich in 
1878 and 1877. The darker shaded areas show the protectionist majority and the lighter areas the ones 
with a free trade majority. It also shows the constituencies that changed from protectionist majority to a 
free trade majority and vice versa. 
 
Alexander Gerschenkron (1943) and James Sheehan (1983) believe that the collapse of the liber-
als occurred because of the antisocialist government campaign in conjunction with the efforts of 
the conservatively inclined Junkers, who brought masses of rural labourers, who had not voted 
before, to the polls. Agriculture certainly played a significant role in changing the majority in the 
parliament, but it is not clear in which way. Scholars do not even agree about whether the inter-
ests of agriculture were homogeneous. Did peasants, Junkers and agricultural labourers have the 
same interest and vote in the same way? In other words, did all men working in the agricultural 6 
sector vote for the same policy, independent of their status or farm size or the production mix of 
the farms on which they worked? Did it make a difference where labourers worked, and did 
Junkers motivate their labourers so much that the increased turnout among them caused the 
change in parliament? While the interest of large landowners, who mainly produced grain, can 
be clearly identified as ‘pro-tariff’, the interest of small farm owners and peasants, who domi-
nated in South-West-Germany, is harder to determine, as I will discuss in more detail in sec-
tion 4. 
Apart from the hypothesis that the mobilisation of farm hands caused the power shift, there are 
other explanations that focus on the motives of voters, which may have changed between 1877 
and 1878. Ronald Rogowski (1989), for example, applies the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model 
to a world with three factors of production: land, labour and capital. According to Rogoswki, 
Germany was relatively abundant in labour and land, but relatively scarce in capital until about 
the mid-1870s. A decline in transportation costs allowed a massive entry of producers from 
countries abundant in land, such as the United States and Russia, into the international grain 
market, making Germany relatively scarce in both capital and land. Agriculture reacted to these 
changes by joining industry in support of protection, the two sectors concluding the notorious 
‘marriage of iron and rye’ in 1879. Yet, if Rogowski is right and one takes into account the fact 
that most voters were workers, the majority of voters should have voted for free trade. Further-
more, it seems implausible that such a major realignment could have occurred within one year. 
Peter Gourevitch (1977/98), by contrast, assumes that certain factors of production are ‘specific’ 
to a particular industry. For example, one could assume that labour is specific and workers would 
then be immobile between sectors and see their fate tied to the sector in which they work. The 
change in 1878 could then perhaps be explained by changes in trade balances. Some sectors be-
came more import-competing, while others, like agriculture, turned from being export-orientated 
to import-competing. Most workers ended up in import-competing sectors; they therefore would 
have voted for protection. The Junkers, who were motivated by a decline in grain prices, led this 
protectionist coalition, along with the producers of iron and steel. That, in a nutshell, is the ra-
tionale behind Gourevitch’s (1977/98) argument. He focuses, however, not particularly on the 
change of politics in Germany but rather on explaining trade policies on a worldwide level. 
Adam Klug (2001) also applies a specific factors model in order to determine whether workers 
voted according to their sectoral interests in the elections in 1877 and 1878. He finds that most 
sectors did not significantly vote according to their sectoral interests, and is therefore unable to 
explain the shift in interest in 1878. The reasons is that he uses data on a very high level of ag-
gregation and applies a too simple methodology, that is, a simple logit regression with too few 
observations. He therefore ignores the problem of ecological inference, which will be explained 
later in detail. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1998) studies roll-call votes about tariffs in the Parlia-
ment. She analyses whether the interests of the constituency determine the vote of its member of 
parliament. One main focus in the paper is the agricultural sector and whether constituencies in 
which grain producers constituted the majority voted differently from ones in which animal hus-
bandry was the dominant production. She finds that there is indeed evidence for a split between 7 
grain producers and animal producers in the voting behaviour for the conservative parties, but 
does not find clear patterns for liberal parties. Mark Brawley (1997) uses a model in which la-
bour is neither stuck in a sector, nor completely mobile. Like Schonhardt-Bailey (1998), he fo-
cuses more on explaining German trade policy over a longer period, rather than on the problem 
of why voters moved towards parties that supported protectionism in 1878. As this brief synopsis 
of the research shows, the question of why voters turned from supporting free trade to protection 
has not yet been satisfactorily answered.  
3.   The Constitutional Background 
From 1871 until 1912 elections were held directly in single member constituencies with repre-
sentatives elected by a majority. The constitution determined that general elections – that is, 
those at the level of the Reich – were to be held according to the principle of ‘one man, one 
vote’. The suffrage extended to men aged 25 and over with the exception of persons under tute-
lage, bankrupts and persons on poor relief. At that time, this was Europe’s most democratic fran-
chise (the electoral laws of the member states of the Reich, in particular Prussia, were less de-
mocratic). Constitutional reality, however, was different. For one thing, constituencies, which 
were originally based on the results of the census of 1864, remained largely unchanged between 
1871 and 1918 despite rapid urbanisation and intra German migrations (Ritter and Niehuss 1980, 
28; Wehler 1995, 1044). As a consequence, in 1912 the slightly more than 10,000 inhabitants of 
the constituency of Schaumburg-Lippe, a small state in North-Western Germany, had the same 
number of parliamentary delegates as the almost 340,000 inhabitants of the constituency of Tel-
tow, on the southern outskirts of Berlin (Ritter and Niehuss 1980, 28). In the long run, therefore, 
rural constituencies had an advantage over urban constituencies. 
Furthermore, the parliament did not elect the head of the government and his fellow ministers. 
Instead, they were chosen by the Kaiser, who usually appointed the Prussian Prime Minister as 
the Reich’s Chancellor. The Reichstag did have some right of legislative initiative, being able to 
propose laws or to refuse to agree to laws proposed by the executive, but its rights were quite 
limited, because the emperor had the right to dissolve the parliament and call new elections at 
any time. In practice, however, the Kaiser left all decisions to his Chancellor, who needed the 
majority of the parliament to pass a law. The composition of the parliament therefore did clearly 
matter.  
4.   Commercial Policy Interests  
The majority of voters were not the owners of farms or large estates, factories or smaller work-
shops, but rather workers, clerks or other employees (Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche 
Reich 7, 1886, 6 ff). Hence, electoral results mainly represent the votes of ‘labour’.  8 
As mentioned above, two different models have traditionally been used to explain the formation 
of commercial policy interests. On the one hand there is the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, 
which assumes that owners of land and capital owners favoured protection, because land and 
capital were scarce in Germany at the time. Employees, on the other hand, being mobile between 
occupations and therefore not strongly interested in the welfare of their current sector, would 
generally have been in favour of free trade, because labour was relatively abundant. According 
to this model, the policy preferences of the agricultural sector vary depending on farm size. 
Small farms specialised in rather labour-intensive products and had a relatively high ratio of la-
bour and land, whereas large farm owners specialised in land-intensive products (see figure 2). If 
the agricultural sector voted rationally, it would therefore not vote homogenously. Small farmers 
and agricultural workers would vote for free trade, whereas large farmers would vote for protec-
tion.  



































Source: Webb (1982, 324) 
 
The other model which is often applied is the specific factors model. Here, labour is specific, and 
workers share the interests of their employers and vote in their sectoral interest. Thus, voters 
working in an import-competing sector would have favoured protection, those working in an 
export sector free trade.  
While there is indeed some anecdotal evidence from the 1870s that may point to workers favour-
ing the protection of their specific sectors (Borchardt 1984, 33), the specific factors model is 
open to several criticisms. First, the transportation of goods and passengers was already quite 
well established in 1880 and migration within Germany had increased greatly since 1870 (Grant 
2005). Furthermore, Rüderiger Hohls (1989) shows evidence for wage convergence between 
sectors from 1850 onwards. Nonetheless, it is likely that labour in Germany, was not completely 
mobile. The mobility between sectors probably varied regionally and also depended on sectors.  
If labour was thus partly specific, then the interests of certain groups of voters can be identified 
by trade balances. Figure 3 shows trade balances for 1872 (a boom year) and 1877 (when the 
economic downturn was well under way). A negative trade balance indicates an import-
competing sector which would have an interest in protection; a positive balance indicates an ex-9 
port sector in which workers would prefer a free trade policy. Most sectors were affected by the 
cyclical downturn in the late 1870s. As figure 3 shows, the sector that was hit hardest was agri-
culture (especially rye and wheat).  

































































































































































































Source: Calculated from Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich 7 (1886, 81-90) and Statistik des 
deutschen Reichs, Band IV (1872, 189-224). 
 
The grain invasion of the late nineteenth century mainly affected owners of the large estates in 
the eastern provinces of Prussia: particularly the Junkers, who had specialised in growing rye. 
The trade deficit for rye rose from 253.9 to 1720.4 million Marks within five years. The same 
development can be observed for all other kinds of grain. If  the policy preferences of the agri-
cultural sector can be determined by the production mix of farms of different sizes, then owners 
of large farms, which specialised in rye and wheat production, had a clear interest in protection. 
The interests of peasants, however, are not so clear in this framework. If Steven Webb (1982) 
was right, then peasants also benefited from the protection of animal products which outweighed 
the impact of protection on the price of fodder.  
Diverging interests crop up in other sectors as well. In the mining, for example, interests de-
pended on the kind of coal or ore that was produced. Brown coal mines, as were import-
competing in 1877 with a trade balance of -52 million Marks, whereas black coal and iron ore 
were export goods with trade balances of 78 and 16 million Marks (Figure 3), respectively. As 
for the construction industry, it did not produce tradable goods and it did not yet depend on im-
ported raw materials or require much factory-produced machinery or similar capital goods. 
Hence, the owners of construction firms were primarily interested in cheap labour. They there-10 
fore should have opposed measures which might force them to raise wages, such as tariffs on 
imported food. 
3 
To summarize, if workers were not completely mobile between sectors, they should have voted 
according to their sectoral interests. Thus, trade balances should predict voting behaviour. Work-
ers employed in import-competing sectors should have voted for protection and voters in export 
sectors for free trade. For the agricultural sector we would expect owners of large estates and 
their workers to have voted for protection. Owners of smaller farms for free trade, although they 
might also have voted if Webb (1982) is correct in arguing that protection was on balance to 
their benefit.  
By contrast, if workers were mobile between sectors, a Heckscher Ohlin model would be more 
appropriate. On the basis of such a model, we would expect workers to have voted for free trade, 
independent of sectoral interests, while owners of capital and landowners would favour protec-
tion. In that case the majority of voters should have voted for free trade, since most voters re-
ceived the greater part of their income through wages, rather than as rent or capital rewards. 
Thus we would not observe voting according to trade balances. In agriculture, workers and peas-
ants would have voted for free trade, since peasant farms had a high ratio of labour to land; own-
ers of large estates, by contrast, would have voted for protection. 
5.   Analysis 
King’s solution to the Ecological Inference Problem 
As mentioned in the introduction, Gary King’s (1997) solution to the problem of ecological in-
ference makes it possible to estimate for each constituency how different occupations voted.  
The nature of ecological inference problems can best be explained with the help of an example. 
Suppose that in a certain election, we know how many votes were cast for free-trade-supporting 
parties and how many for protectionists, and we know how many voters were farmers and how 
many worked in other sectors. This information is available for every constituency. What we are 
interested in is the voting behaviour of individuals, or at least of sub-aggregates, for example 
how many farmers voted for free trade in a particular constituency. Why is answering such ques-
tions a problem? Assume that in one constituency 30 percent of the electorate consists of farmers 
and that 30 percent of the votes are for parties that support free trade. In a second constituency 
40 percent of the electorate consists of farmers and 40 percent of votes were cast for free-trade-
supporting parties. It thus seems that there is a perfect positive correlation between farmers and 
votes for free trade. Yet no matter how intuitive this relationship may seem to be farmers might 
                                        
3   Another question that arises here is whether definitions of sectors as provided by national statistics are too 
broad, and whether the reported sectors consisted of sub-sectors with different interests. Furthermore, not all 
firms subsumed in an ‘export sector’ were necessarily exporters. Melitz (2003) provides a theoretical model 
that shows how exposure to trade can encourage more productive firms to export, while simultaneously 
harming the least productive firms in a sector which is generally considered as exporting. 11 
not actually have voted for free trade at all. The votes for free trade might come from industrial 
workers, who could conceivably favour free-trade-supporting parties in districts dominated by 
agriculture. Hypothesising about the behaviour of individuals by using aggregate data can there-
fore be misleading- the problem of ecological inference. The problem is well known in political 
science: William Ogburn and Inez Goltra (1919) introduced it in the very first multivariate statis-
tical analysis ever to have been published in a political science journal, and it has been among 
the longest-standing unsolved problems in quantitative social science (King 1997). 
Precisely this problem rears its ugly head if we try to determine which occupations caused the 
shift in parliament in 1878, if new voters or floating voters were primarily responsible, and why 
these groups voted the way they did. We have only aggregate data: election results, shares of 
specific occupations in specific regions and so forth. 
Table 2 shows how the problem can be illustrated in a formal manner. Suppose we want to find 
out whether or not workers in a specific sector voted for parties that supported free trade. The 
table shows the problem for one constituency and for two groups of voters, i.e. for those favour-
ing free trade and protection, respectively. Here the workers employed in sector J are the voters 
of interest.  
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i x is the share of the workforce in constituency i employed in sector J. This could be, for example, 
the share of farmers.  i V  is the share of votes for free-trade-supporting parties in the constituency i and 1-
i V  the share of votes for parties that support protection.  i T  is the percentage turnout. These values are 
known. The unknown quantities of interest are: 
J
i λ , which is the share of workers in sector J in the con-
stituency i that voted for free ;
J
i
− λ , which is the share of workers of sectors outside J that voted for free 
trade;
J
i β  , which is the turnout of the workers in sector J in the constituency i; and 
J
i
− β , which is the 
turnout of workers in other sectors. 
 
For every constituency, national statistics provide the values in the margins of the table, where 
index i indicates constituency i, and J indicates sector J. 
J
i x is the share of the workforce in con-
stituency i employed in sector J. This could be, for example, the share of farmers in constituency 
i.  i V  is the share of votes for free-trade-supporting parties in constituency i and 1- i V  the share of 12 
votes for parties that support protection.  i T  is the percentage turnout for constituency i. Data on 
voting shares and turnout per constituency for Germany are provided by Danièle  Caramani 
(2000). What these national statistics do not show, however, are the values in the inner cells of 
the table, such as the shares of various occupations in a particular constituency that voted for free 
trade, for protection, or abstained; that is the  i λ ’s and  i β ’s, which are not directly observed. 
J
i λ  
is the share of workers in sector J in constituency I, who voted for free trade and 
J
i λ − 1  is the 
share of workers of sector J who voted for protection. For example, assuming that J is the agri-
cultural sector, 
J
i λ  is the share of farmers who voted for free trade and 
J
i λ − 1  the share of farm-
ers who voted for protection. Similarly, 
J
i
− λ is the share of non-agricultural workers who voted 
for free trade, and 
J
i
− −λ 1  is the share of non-agricultural workers who voted for protection. 
J
i β is the turnout of the workers in sector J in the constituency. Clearly these parameters are the 
really relevant ones if we are interested in why the protectionists won the 1878 election in Ger-
many. Estimating these values not only provides far more and better information about the vot-
ing behaviour of different sectors than other methodological approaches, but also creates new 
dependent variables that can then be used to study influences on voters’ decisions.  
King begins by observing that we can deterministically put some limits on individual behaviour 
from the available aggregate data. Assume that we observe two types of voters (farmers and non-
farmers) and two voting options (voting or not voting). The turnout in constituency i ( i T ) is just 
the proportion of farmers who voted in this district (
J
i β ) times the share of farmers in constitu-
ency i ( i X ), plus the proportion of non-farmers who voted multiplied by the share of non-
farmers in this constituency: 




i i X X T − + =
− β β  (1) 
Since the turnout is known, the true proportions of voters among farmers and non-farmers must 
fall somewhere on a downward sloping line, whose slope is determined by the ratio of farmers to 




























β β  (3) 
If we had only one set of aggregate data, for example, information on turnout and the share of 
farmers for the whole of Germany, this would be as far as we could go, but we have aggregate 
data for every constituency. Each set of aggregate data, that is, every constituency, gives us such 
a line, and King illustrates those lines by creating a ‘tomography plot’ (cf. the Appendix I). This 
is informative, but does not provide enough information to get a clear solution. There is no exact 
way of recovering the values in the inner cells of table 2. The simplest assumption to start with is 
that the true proportions for each constituency are picked at random from some distribution, but 
that all constituencies are drawn from the same population. King focuses on the case where that 
distribution fits the joint probabilities to a truncated bivariate normal distribution so that all pro-
portions are between 0 and 1. In order to get the parameters from the truncated bivariate normal 
distribution, King uses the lines from the tomography plot. The normality assumption helps de-13 
tect the mode on the tomography plot (see Appendix I), where most of the lines cross, and im-
proves estimates by ‘borrowing strength’ from other constituencies. Intuitively, the most likely 
values for 
J
i β  and 
J
i
− β  are nearest the mode. Adding a couple of modest assumptions, five in-
termediate parameters that define the truncated bivariate distribution are estimated via a maxi-
mum likelihood function. The parameters are then transformed and rescaled. The means of the 
distribution of 
J
i β  and 
J
i
− β  are used as point estimates, and standard errors are based upon the 
variation in the simulated values. Thus King’s Algorithm provides sub-estimates for every con-
stituency and thereby extracts much more information from the available data than simpler 
econometric tools. 
Furthermore one can use additional information as control variables to ensure the quality of the 
estimation. If chosen correctly, these variables will control for ‘aggregation bias’. Aggregation 
bias occurs if the variation of the parameters 
J
i β  and 
J
i
− β  or 
J
i λ  and 
J
i
− λ  in specific areas differs 
from the general pattern of the aggregated constituency. The idea is that this variation can be 
systematically explained by other variables (see Appendix I for an example). Here, the assump-
tion that no aggregation bias exists is replaced with the assumption that the truncated normal 
means depend on external covariates (see King 1997, 288). I include covariates in the estimation 
of the agricultural sector, since I use the point estimates of the 
J
i λ  in a second stage regression. 
Therefore I need to include all independent variables from this regression as covariates in the 
first estimation (see Herron and Shotts, 2004). For the other sectors I also tried covariates, but 
the results did not perceptibly vary. This also suggests that there was little aggregation bias in the 
first place.  
As a description of the methods used to estimate these parameters is beyond the scope of this 
paper, the reader is referred to King (1997) for full details.
4 Appendix II gives some more de-
tailed information about the method. 
Results 
Figure 4 shows the occupational categories in Germany for males over the age of 14. Although 
males were allowed to vote only from the age of 25, national statistics do not provide more de-
tailed information about the ages of different occupational groups. I assume that the share of oc-
cupations shown in Figure 4 equals the distribution of the electorate among different sectors, 








                                        
4   I estimated the quantities of interest applying Benoit’s and King’s (2003) Ezi software.  14 
Figure 4: Occupational categories, Germany 1882 
 
Textiles















Note: Data on the employment of women were removed for those industries which constituted more than 
1 percent of the workforce.  
 
Source: Calculated from the Occupational Census 1882 (Statistik des Deutschen Reiches  (1884, 214-
429) ) 
New Voters 
I will first present the results for the betas (the turnout among occupations) to determine whether 
it was new or floating voters who made the difference. The estimation provides separate point 
estimates for every one of the 396 constituencies. Rather than presenting all 396 point estimates 
separately, I broke down the constituencies into different regions, and present the average of 
these point estimates across constituencies in each region.  
Table 3 provides the average estimation results for all 396 constituencies. The overall turnout 
increased slightly from 60.6 percent in 1877 to 62.3 percent in 1878 (Ritter and Niehuss, 1980, 
38f). Since I estimated turnout for each sector separately I also provide the estimated overall 
turnout, i.e. the weighted sum of the turnout for each sector, where the weights are the number of 
voters from each sector. As one can see, the result is close to the turnout provided from national 
statistics, which lends credence to the estimation process. Overall the diagnostics, i.e. the tomo-
graphy plots for all sectors do not show signs of aggregation bias. Appendix I provides the to-
mography plot for the estimation of the turnout in the agricultural sector in 1878.  
The first notable result achieved with the help of King’s method is that in 1878 turnout in agri-
culture increased only slightly, by about 0.5 percent, which is approximately 1660 votes more 
than in 1877. Thus it seems that it was not increased turnout in the agricultural sector which 
made the difference in the election in 1878. The turnout of voters employed in the iron industry, 
the other party in the ‘Marriage of Rye and Iron’, even decreased slightly from 53.6 to 53.1 per-15 
cent of votes. Most of the new voters, it turns out, actually came from mining, textiles and ‘other 
industries’.  
Table  3: Results for Germany, turnout (betas) among occupations 
 












Agriculture  0.629 0.035 0.632 0.061    0.48 
Chemicals  0.525 0.090 0.551 0.058    4.95 
Construction  0.537 0.078 0.567 0.040    5.59 
Iron  0.536 0.079 0.531 0.087  -0.93 
Metal working  0.539 0.079 0.559 0.055    3.71 
Mining   0.551 0.065 0.950 0.098    72.41 
Other Industry  0.393 0.068 0.546 0.080    38.93 
Others  0.308 0.059 0.535 0.254    73.70 
Stones  0.414 0.026 0.536 0.079    29.47 
Textiles  0.451 0.019 0.629 0.107    39.47 
Trade  0.547 0.078 0.540 0.079  -1.28 
Unemployed  0.395 0.053 0.167 0.026  -57.72 
Overall turn-
out* 
0.606       0.131  0.623      0.111   
Estimated  
Overall turnout 
0.521      0.084  0.629      0.089   
Constituencies  397       
Source: see text 
 
Note: Figures are mean quantities by occupation 
‘Other Industries’ covers the production of machines and scientific apparatus, leather and paper, wood 
working, food and clothing 
‘others’ covers the remaining sectors: forestry, fishing, peat-cuttering, printing, arts, insurance, lodging, 
servants and public servants 
*(Ritter and Niehuss, 1980) 
 
Using King’s Algorithm, we can estimate the turnout by occupation for specific regions. Table 4 
provides the results for East-Elbia.
5 Here, the turnout in the agricultural sector increased by 10.5 
percent, from 56 to 61.9. The agricultural sector in this area was dominated by large estates, 
which specialised to a large extent in grain production and can therefore be expected to have 
been protectionist. There might therefore be some truth to Gerschenkron’s (1943) hypothesis that 
parliament changed because rural workers in East Prussia who had not voted in 1877 suddenly 
ran to the polls in 1878. However, this hypothesis can only be confirmed by looking at those 
constituencies where the liberals lost the majority. 
                                        
5   That is, for the Prussian provinces of Brandenburg, Silesia, Pomerania, Posen and West-and East-Prussia, 
which were east of the river Elbe. 16 
Table 4: Results for East-Elbian Prussia, turnout (betas) among occupations 












Change in  
turnout in 
percent 
Agriculture  0.560 0.030 0.619 0.051  10.54   
Chemicals  0.330 0.077 0.280 0.043  -15.15   
Construction  0.310 0.064 0.263 0.028  -15.16   
Iron  0.308 0.065 0.327 0.074  6.17   
Metal working  0.316 0.067 0.279 0.042  -11.71   
Mining   0.718 0.056 0.940 0.082  30.92   
Other Industry  0.429 0.071 0.323 0.069  -24.71   
Others  0.337 0.060 0.561 0.266  66.47   
Stones  0.737 0.018 0.312 0.065  -57.67   
Textiles  0.289 0.018 0.755 0.082 161.25   
Trade  0.318 0.067 0.314 0.065  -1.26   
Unemployed  0.490 0.054 0.202 0.027  -58.78   
Overall turn-
out* 
0.564  0.622      
Constituencies 114           
Source: see text 
 
Note: Figures are mean quantities by occupation 
‘Other Industries’ covers the production of machines and scientific apparatus, leather and paper, wood 
working, food and clothing 
‘others’ covers the remaining sectors: forestry, fishing, peat-cuttering, printing, arts, insurance, lodging, 
servants and public servants 
*(Ritter and Niehuss, 1980) 
 
In 1878 the liberals lost 50 seats and won 4 (see figure 1). In the constituencies where the liberals 
lost the turnout estimates still support Gerschenkron’s (1943) hypothesis (Table 5). Turnout 
among people employed in the agricultural sector increased by 9.6 percent. The other two sectors 
which experienced a significant increase in votes were mining and textiles. The category ‘oth-
ers’, which includes the remaining sectors forestry, fishing, peat-cutting, printing, arts, insurance, 
lodging, public servants and servants, also seems to have had a huge rise in turnout. All of these 
sectors, however, have only a very small absolute number of voters and can therefore be ignored. 
 17 
Table 5: Results for the constituencies in which the liberals lost the vote, turnout (betas)  
among occupations  
   1877  1878 









out in percent 
Agriculture  0.593 0.033 0.650 0.063  9.61   
Chemicals  0.468 0.076 0.489 0.046  4.49   
Construction  0.479 0.065 0.510 0.031  6.47   
Iron  0.484 0.066 0.477 0.075  -1.45   
Metal working  0.472 0.067 0.496 0.042  5.08   
Mining   0.601 0.058 0.942 0.064  56.74   
Other Industry  0.429 0.071 0.486 0.069  13.29   
Others  0.323 0.059 0.532 0.282  64.71   
Stones  0.470 0.021 0.476 0.064  1.28   
Textiles  0.388 0.017 0.682 0.092  75.77   
Trade  0.486 0.066 0.484 0.065  -0.41   
Unemployed  0.459 0.052 0.186 0.028  -59.48   
Overall turn-
out* 
0.579  0.631      
Constituencies   50         
 
Note: Figures mean quantities by occupation 
‘Other Industries’ covers the production of machines and scientific apparatus, leather and paper, wood 
working, food and clothing 
‘others’ covers the remaining sectors: forestry, fishing, peat-cuttering, printing, arts, insurance, lodging, 
servants and public servants 
*(Ritter and Niehuss, 1980) 
Floating Voters 
Tables 6 and 7 provide the average values of the estimates of the lambdas of table 2, i.e. the 
share of votes for free trade, for both the 1877 and 1878 elections, by sector and for different 
geographical areas. The sectors are classified according to their trade balances in order to see 
whether the specific factors model can predict voting behaviour. All other sectors, i.e. those 
which have an interest that cannot clearly be defined, such as mining, and non-traded sectors, 
such as construction, are not classified.  
The results for Germany as a whole (table 6) explain why Klug (2001) found that most occupa-
tions had no significant preference for a certain trade policy: In 1877, the shares of votes for free 
trade and protectionism were fairly similar in each sector: In agriculture, for example, 50.7 per-
cent of voters voted for free trade and 49.3 percent for protection . However, the important elec-
tion was the one in 1878 and here the picture changed. 
The majority of voters employed in agriculture, textiles, stones and metal working now tended to 
vote according to their sectoral interests as defined by sectoral trade balances. The largest shift 
towards protection was in the agricultural sector. Here the share of votes for free trade dropped 
by 13.8 percent. Support for free trade also fell off sharply in the iron industry (Table 6). It 18 
seems that the famous ‘marriage of rye and iron’, the coalition between heavy industry and large 
landowners, dominated the change in votes in the election in 1878. But voters in the textile sec-
tor also rallied for protectionism, 52 percent of them in 1878, as opposed to only 46.7 percent in 
1877.  
Table 6: Results for Germany, share of votes for free trade by sector (lambda) 



















Agriculture  0.507 0.018 0.437 0.065  -13.81   
Chemicals*  0.530 0.151 0.552 0.071  4.15   




  Textiles  0.533 0.034 0.480 0.075  -9.94   
Iron  0.536 0.036 0.475 0.073  -11.38    Positive trade 
balance 
 
Metal working  0.545 0.041 0.578 0.072  6.06   
Construction  0.533 0.033 0.505 0.085  -5.25   
Mining   0.586 0.083 0.530 0.071  -9.56   
Other Industry  0.456 0.073 0.456 0.073  0.00   
Trade  0.533 0.032 0.466 0.081  -12.57   
Others  0.528 0.036 0.465 0.068  -11.93   
Others 
Unemployed  0.527 0.037 0.490 0.074  -7.02   
  Constituencies 397         
 
Note: Figures mean quantities by occupation 
‘Other Industries’ covers the production of machines and scientific apparatus, leather and paper, wood 
working, food and clothing 
‘others’ covers the remaining sectors: forestry, fishing, peat-cuttering, printing, arts, insurance, lodging, 
servants and public servants 
 
Again, it is possible to make estimates for different regions. In East-Elbia (table 7), nearly all 
sectors seem relatively indifferent between free trade and protection in 1877, but in 1878 protec-
tionist parties gained support across all sectors. The slight lead of protectionist became a clear 
protectionist majority. Although turnout in this sector increased by 10.53 percent, quite a large 
number of voters rejected free trade, since the share of votes for free trade decreased by 27.9 
percent.  
As we have seen in table 4, a large number of new votes were cast in the mining and textiles sec-
tors. In both sectors, votes for free trade plummeted with shares dropping 24.83 and 38.93 per-
cent, respectively. In East Prussia, the mining sector mainly focused on brown coal, which was 
import-competing (see figure 3). Miners in East Prussia would thus have had an interest in pro-
tection, and indeed voters from this sector voted for protection in both years. This result supports 
the hypothesis that the specific factors model can predict voting behaviour to a certain degree. 
The main point of the table, however, is that the entire region shifted towards protectionism, ex-
cept for ‘other industries’, and not just the agricultural sector. 19 
Table 7: Results for East-Elbia, share of votes for free trade by sector (lambda) 
   1877  1878  
















Agriculture  0.493 0.017 0.355 0.055  -27.99   
Chemicals  0.476 0.190 0.402 0.056  -15.55   
Stones  0.520 0.050 0.313 0.055  -39.81   




Textiles  0.506 0.034 0.309 0.053  -38.93   





0.476 0.039 0.432 0.057  -9.24   
Construction  0.506 0.033 0.364 0.075  -28.06   
Other Indus-
try 
0.305 0.057 0.305 0.057  0.00   
Others  0.503 0.034 0.304 0.054  -39.56   
Trade  0.505 0.032 0.318 0.064  -37.03   
Others 
Unemployed  0.499 0.036 0.313 0.056  -37.27   
 114  constituencies           
 
Note: Figures mean quantities by occupation 
‘Other Industries’ covers the production of machines and scientific apparatus, leather and paper, wood 
working, food and clothing 
‘others’ covers the remaining sectors: forestry, fishing, peat-cuttering, printing, arts, insurance, lodging, 
servants and public servants 
 
The results for the constituencies where the liberals lost the majority are shown in table 8. All 
sectors except ‘other industries’ voted for free trade in 1877. In 1878 voters employed in agricul-
ture and textiles changed their voting behaviour, which eventually changed the electoral result.  
In these constituencies, the free trade votes from agriculture collapsed and fell by 43.07 percent, 
which was far more than the increase in turnout (from 0.593 to 0.65, from Table 5). More than 
new voters, it was floating voters in the agricultural sector, who caused the change in favour of 
protectionists. Other sectors such as textiles and iron also rallied to protectionism, but in absolute 
votes the agricultural sector had much more influence, since it constituted the biggest part of the 
electorate.  
While in 1877 most sectors did not vote in the way that trade balances would predict, the picture 
changed in 1878. Most sectors now voted in a predictable manner. The exceptions were chemi-
cals, which were still in favour of free trade, but less so than in 1877, and the iron sector which 
was now in favour of protection. The latter can be explained by the more complex structure of 
the iron industry. The iron industry needed semi-finished products, which were imported. Firms 
that specialised in the production of semi-finished products therefore demanded protection 
(Webb 1980). The interest in protection might also be explained from a Heckscher Ohlin per-
spective, since heavy industry is capital intensive. Capital was scarce in Germany at the time and 
thus heavy industry would have had an interest in protection rather than in free trade.  20 
Table 8: Results for the constituencies in which the liberals lost the majority, share of votes for 
free trade by sector (lambda) 



















Agriculture  0.729 0.020  0.415  0.099  -43.07  
Chemicals*  0.695 0.189  0.589  0.081  -15.25  
Stones  0.733 0.050  0.440  0.082  -39.97  
Negative trade 
balance 
Textiles  0.735 0.034  0.440  0.081  -40.14  
Iron  0.736 0.036  0.445  0.076  -39.54   Positive trade 
balance  Metal working  0.764 0.040  0.615  0.082  -19.50  
Construction  0.734 0.033  0.540  0.104  -26.43  
Mining   0.667 0.065  0.495  0.075  -25.79  
Other Industry  0.427 0.087  0.428  0.073  0.00  
Others  0.728 0.040  0.428  0.075  -41.21  
Trade  0.735 0.032  0.431  0.092  -41.36  
Other  
Unemployed  0.724 0.039  0.454  0.083  -37.29  
 Constituencies  50         
 
Note: Figures mean quantities by occupation 
‘Other Industries’ covers the production of machines and scientific apparatus, leather and paper, wood 
working, food and clothing 
‘others’ covers the remaining sectors: forestry, fishing, peat-cuttering, printing, arts, insurance, lodging, 
servants and public servants 
 
In summary, voters’ decisions did to a large extend depend on their sectoral interests, especially 
in the critical election in 1878 that caused the change towards protection. In every sector some 
voters casts their ballots according to expectations derived from trade balances, which lends sup-
port to the specific factors model. It is true that there were always large groups who voted in the 
opposite way. Their behaviour can be explained in several ways. Conceivably, the sectors con-
sisted of different sub-sectors which cannot be distinguished on the basis of the available infor-
mation. One example of this is the mining sector discussed above. It is also possible, that not all 
firms in an ‘export sector’ actually exported (cf. Melitz 2003). But for the political landslide that 
occurred between 1877 and 1878, floating voters from the agricultural sector rather than new 
voters made the difference, even though turnout did rise.  
Although the specific factors model predicts the voters’ decisions quite well, it does not help us 
to answer the question of why so many agricultural workers changed their mind within one year. 
Maybe the fact that the second election was more dominated by the tariff question triggered the 
change. Other political issues, which became less important in 1878, might have biased the result 
to the benefit of the liberal parties in the election in 1877. Another question remains as well: did 
the agricultural sector vote homogeneously? In other words, did agricultural workers, peasants 
and large land owners all vote for protection? Did farm size matter for voting decisions? Did 
peasants and workers on small farms vote for free trade?  21 
Behind the Curtain of the Polling Booth 
To answer these questions and determine what motivated voters in the agricultural sector we can 
take the estimate of the share of votes, for free trade and use it as the dependent variable in a 
second stage regression. The practice of using quantities generated by applying King’s Algo-
rithm as dependent variables is known in the methodological literature as ‘EI-R’. Hence, I use 








i x ε α α λ + + = ∑
=1
0  
The dependent variable 
FT
i λ  is the point estimate of the share of voters working in the agricul-
tural sector who voted for free trade in district i.  0 α  is the constant term and the explanatory 
variables  ki x  cover possible influences on voting behaviour across districts.  i ε  is the error term. I 
use the share of immigrants per constituency as a right-hand side variable: the data on immi-
grants were taken from Statistik des deutschen Reichs 1888. Regions with a larger share of im-
migrants were probably wealthier than others, offering more and better jobs and therefore attract-
ing more workers than others. They also had higher economic growth rates and were probably 
more favourable to free trade. A larger share of immigrants might also indicate higher sectoral 
mobility, which would increase the support for free trade, on the assumption that labour was the 
abundant factor in Germany. This share differs largely among regions, as shown in figure 5. 

















































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Calculated from Statistik des Deutschen Reichs N.F. 32, Berlin (1888), 212-35. 
                                        
6  I am aware of the problems involved in using these variables in a second-stage analysis and have carefully 
followed the recommendations made by Adolph, King et al. (2003). First, I exclude any quantities not origi-
nally included as covariates in the first-stage estimation as independent variables in EI-R. Second, I apply 
weighted least squares using the estimated standard errors from the first-stage estimation as weights, as rec-
ommended by Herron and Shotts (2004). 22 
As shown above, in every region there was a group of agricultural voters who in both elections 
voted for free trade, but previous research does not agree on whether all agricultural producers, 
or only the owners of large estates, benefited from tariffs. While information about specific 
groups of farmers is lacking at the level of ‘Kreise’, there are data on the sizes of the farms. 
Since larger farms generally specialised in grain production and would therefore benefit from 
protection and smaller farms typically specialised in animal husbandry and might therefore have 
been harmed by protection, the farm size can be used to analyse whether the voters from the ag-
ricultural sector voted in their own interest. Hence I include variables on the size in hectares of 
farms from the Statistik des Deutschen Reichs 112: Berufs- und Gewerbezählung vom 14. Juni 
1895. Die Landwirthschaft im Deutschen Reich.  
Apart from political questions such as the tariff issue, there were other, social influences on the 
voters’ decisions, such as tradition and religion. Catholic priests tended to encourage their pa-
rishioners to vote for the Centre party; their influence is therefore expected to have a negative 
influence on the share of free trade votes. The population census of 1880 provides the share of 
Catholics at the level of ‘Regierungsbezirke’ . I assume that this share was equal in all constitu-
encies belonging to a certain ‘Regierungsbezirk’. Table 9 gives an overview of all variables. 
Table 9: Overview of variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share of votes for free trade 1877 388 0.507 0.335 0 1
Share of votes for free trade 1878 388 0.437 0.326 0 1
Share of immigrants 388 0.004 0.006 0 0.026
Turnout77 388 0.607 0.132 0.230 0.906
Turnout78 388 0.625 0.111 0.179 0.910
Share of Catholics 388 0.367 0.340 0.003 0.992
Farm size: less than 1 ha 388 0.067 0.053 0.008 0.406
Farm size: 20 to 50 ha 388 0.014 0.006 0.001 0.030
Farm size: more than 100 ha 388 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001  
 
Source: see text. 
 
Table 10 provides the results for the elections in 1877 and 1878. The dependent variables are the 
shares of votes for free trade in 1877 and 1878, respectively. The share of immigrants has a posi-
tive impact on voting for free trade, which suggests that richer and better-developed regions 
tended to attract people and were also more free trade orientated, although not significantly so. It 
might also indicate that increased mobility had a positive impact on voting for free trade. 
For the question of how the agricultural sector voted, let us consider the impact of farm size on 
voting behaviour is most interesting.  
Voters from regions with smaller farms (under 1 hectare) favoured free trade, although only sig-
nificantly in 1877. Middle-sized farms seem to have been quite indifferent, as the very low t-
statistics show. The large estates with more than 100 hectares have a negative sign, which is 
highly significant in 1878. According to the regression results, it thus seems that Gerschenkron 23 
(1943) was wrong for small farmers tended to vote for free trade. Whether that was rational or 
not depends, however, on whether one believes the Heckscher-Ohlin and specific factors model 
arguments that small farmers were harmed by protection, or Webb’s (1982) claim that peasants 
also gained from protection.  
Another result worth mentioning is the strong impact of the share of Catholics on the decision to 
vote for protection in both elections. The result is driven by the votes for the Centre Party, the 
political arm of Catholicism, and is not surprising considering the ‘Kulturkampf’ between Bis-
marck and the Catholic Church. When the conflict threatened to turn into a defeat for the Chan-
cellor, he decided to follow a more moderate course and, in 1878, lifted most sanctions he had 
imposed in the early 1870s.
7 In the ‘Kulturkampf’-period, the Centre Party actually gained 
power, doubling the number of its voters in 1874. It remained strong until the mid 1880s (Ritter 
and Niehuss 1980) and attracted Catholics who expressed their support for the Church by voting 
Centre. Margaret Anderson (1993) found a number of cases where the elections were strongly 
influenced by the agitation of Catholic priests and she argued that not just priests, but all of 
Germany’s elites - the mayors of the cities as well as the ‘Landräte’ (district officials) and Junk-
ers in the countryside - tried to influence voters and could do so because the imperial election 
system was not sufficiently protected by secrecy. Gerschenkron (1943) made a similar argument 
about Junkers forcing agricultural workers to vote for protection. It is likely that Junkers and 
priests tried to influence voters and that they were successful in some constituencies.  
Table 10: Results second stage estimation 
 (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable  Lambda 1877= Share of 
voters from the agricul-
tural sector that voted 
for free trade support-
ing parties in 1877 
Lambda 1878= Share of 
voters from the agricul-
tural sector that voted 
for free trade support-
ing parties in 1878 
Immigrants  6.413 4.014 
  (1.94) (1.83) 
Turnout  0.208 0.411 
  (2.00)* (3.92)** 
Share of Catholics  -0.276 -0.323 
  (6.42)** (9.04)** 
Farm size: less than 1 ha  0.657 0.267 
  (2.26)* (1.14) 
Farm size: 20 to 50 ha  -0.322 -1.330 
  (0.12) (0.60) 
Farm size: more than 100 ha  -44.486 -104.283 
  (0.87) (2.64)** 
Constant  0.400 0.358 
  (4.32)** (4.22)** 
Observations  290 303 
R-squared  0.21 0.28 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
Source of variables: see text 
                                        
7   (See for instance Evans 1981) 24 
Nonetheless, in the 1878 election voting was by and large consistent with self-interest in that 
sectoral votes do by and large confirm the prediction of trade models. It is clear, too, that non-
economic factors such as religion mattered for a voter’s decision. Even today, it is not unusual 
for non-economic factors to influence trade policy preferences with variables like patriotism and 
chauvinism influencing trade policy preferences (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 
2005). 
6.   Conclusion 
Toward the end of the 1870s, Europe began to turn away from the free trade policies which had 
characterised the middle decades of the century. Germany was one of the first countries to 
change course, and German tariff policies affected the whole continent. Not surprisingly, there-
fore, research has paid considerable attention to political decision-making in Germany, and there 
is a broad literature that seeks to explain the country’s about-turn in commercial policies, which 
occurred after 1878.  
While this political landslide has been repeatedly studied from a quantitative perspective, prior 
research, especially on the tariff elections in Germany, suffers from a number of defects. First, it 
applies methods such as simple logistic regressions, which are not sufficient to explain voting 
behaviour in general elections. Second, it is exclusively based on data aggregated at a relatively 
high level.  
In this paper I use much more detailed data on the level of constituencies. I further apply King’s 
(1997) Algorithm with which I generate shares of voters from different occupations that voted 
for protection or free trade for every constituency, which makes it possible to break down the 
results for district regions. That allows us to focus on constituencies where the liberals lost their 
seats in 1878 and to analyse them separately. The analysis changes our picture of what went on 
between the two elections of 1877 and 1878. In particular, the results contradict Gerschenkron’s 
(1943) view that change was solely due to new voters from the agricultural sector. He was right 
that there were large numbers of new voters (around ten percent more) from the agricultural sec-
tor, especially in East-Elbian Prussia. But the losses that free-traders suffered to the benefit of 
protectionists were much higher (around 27 percent). Thus, it was floating voters rather than new 
voters from the agricultural sector who caused the change.  
King’s Algorithm also makes it possible to analyse more closely the characteristics of those agri-
cultural voters who turned towards protection. The existing literature has not yet revealed 
whether agriculture voted as a single block. Schonhardt-Bailey (1998) did provide some evi-
dence that the agricultural sector did not vote homogeneously, but she showed this only for con-
servative parties. My analysis did yield evidence that small farmers preferred free trade, while 
farmers owning large estates and workers on these estates favoured protection. This fits well the 
expectations of both the Heckscher-Ohlin and specific factors models. 25 
But a complete answer for why voters in the agricultural sector changed their behaviour in just 
one year remains elusive and is left to future research. It seems likely that the fact that the second 
election was more dominated by the tariff question caused the change. Maybe other political di-
mensions, which became less important in 1878, biased the result in favour of liberal parties in 
the election in 1877. 
Explaining the political shift in 1878 is all the more important because it provided Bismarck with 
the conservative majority that he needed in order to diminish the influence of his former liberal 
allies and to prevent the liberalisation – and ultimately democratisation – of Imperial Germany. 
Protective tariffs for industry and agriculture were the price the Chancellor paid. The price paid 
by the country as a whole ultimately proved to be much higher. Behind the protective walls of 
new tariffs, agriculture retained its huge share in the economy, and this did not bode well for 
Germany’s development in the later 19
th and 20
th centuries (Temin 2002). 
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Appendix I 
This appendix provides some basic goodness of fit diagnostics for the turnout of the agricultural 
sector. 
One major problem that might arise is the ‘aggregation bias’. Aggregation bias occurs if the 
variation of the parameters 
J
i β  and 
J
i
− β  or 
J
i λ  and 
J
i
− λ  in specific areas differ from the general 
pattern of the aggregated constituency. 
One simple example will clarify this. Assume that on the individual level, turnout of non-farmers 
systematically exceeds turnout of farmers. Further assume that one can observe a positive corre-
lation between the turnout and the share of farmers, if plotted for all constituencies. This implies 
that, if the proportion of farmers increases, the turnout increases as well. The mistaken ecological 
inference is that farmers vote at higher levels than non-farmers. If this problem occurs one can 
use additional variables, which explain the rise in turnout. However, in the data I use I could not 
observe a systematic relationship between the overall turnout and the share of workers from a 
specific sector. Figures 1 and 2 show this for the turnout of the agricultural sector in 1878. 









Note: Tomography plot with 95% (outside circle) and 50% (circle inside) maximum likelihood contours 
superimposed on the deterministic information from the bounds. Each contour represents possible out-
comes for 
J β  and 
J − β . The peak of the probability surface is anchored above the highest density of line 
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Figure 2: Relationship between the share of people working in the agricultural sector (x) and 











The results would be biased if there was a systematic relationship between turnout and x, i.e. 
J β  
and 
J
i β  and X. The bias caused is called “aggregation bias”.  
There is no observable relationship between the share of people working in the agricultural sec-
tor (x) and overall turnout for every constituency, and hence no aggregation bias.  
Appendix II 
King’s Algorithm is based on Goodman’s regression, which is often used to account for ecologi-
cal inference
8. Goodman’s regression is loosely based on the following accounting identity: 




i i X X T − + =
− β β , 
where  i T  is the proportion of the voting-age population turning out to vote in constituency i and 
i X  the proportion of workers employed in sector J working in district i. 
J
i β  and 
J
i
− β  are then 
the estimated coefficients for the turnout of the two sectors. Naturally, the differences between 
the left and right hand sides of Equation 1 should result from purely random effects  i ε , so that 
Goodman’s model can be written as: 
                                        
8   For example, Sperber (1997) used this approach to estimate voting behaviour in nineteenth century Germany 
for all parties and groups, in order to provide a general overview about voting behaviour. However, he did 
not consider trade policy in order to identify or explain the change in 1878. 
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Equation 2:     i i
J
i
J X X T ε β β + − + =
− ) 1 (  
The regression is estimated with no constant term and may be estimated with ordinary least 
squares.  
However, Goodman’s regression does not produce estimates of 
J
i β  and 
J
i
− β  unless they are the 
same for all constituencies, which presumably they are not. It also does not include information 
from the method of bounds, which accounts for the basic information that the parameters of in-
terest are proportions and thus can only range between zero and one. This is the problem that can 
lead to unrealistic results, such as where more than a hundred percent of a certain group of voters 
are estimated to have voted for a certain party. 
King’s algorithm overcomes the limitations of Goodman’s regression. For the purpose of this 
paper, I just give a brief outline of its main features. The interested reader is referred to King 
(1997) where the algorithm is discussed in full.  
King’s solution has two central characteristics. The first is the probability model used to describe 
the disaggregated quantities of interest. In this model, 
J
i β  and 
J
i
− β  follow a truncated bivariate 
normal distribution as follows: 





i TBN x ≈
− , 
where  [] [] 1 , 0 1 , 0 x A =  is the domain of truncation, meaning that the quantities of interest range 
between 0 and 1. The vector ψ (  contains the parameters (means, variances and correlation coef-
ficients) of the original, untruncated bivariate normal distribution. Note that  ) ,.... 1 ( l i xi = , which 
is the vector including the shares of voters from sector J in constituency i for all constituencies, 
is taken as given. It is assumed that 
J
i β  and 
J
i
− β  are independent of  i x , which implies that ag-
gregation bias is absent. 
The second feature of King’s approach is the strict adoption of the accounting identity shown in 
equation 1. King used this identity as an integral part of his model structure, which establishes a 
link between the disaggregate and aggregate quantities. Together with the additional assumption 
of spatial independence between the observations, this allowed King to derive the distribution of 
i T , say  ) / ( ψ (
i t p , and the likelihood function based on the aggregate data: 





i i t p t p L
1
/ ) / ( ) ( ψ ψ ψ ( ( (  
where t is a vector of observed aggregate proportions, as defined above. Given this, King was 
also able to derive the predictive distributions of the betas,  ) / ( ,ψ (
i
J
i t b p  for sector J and 
) / ( ,ψ (
i
J
i t b p
−  for all other sectors, each being a univariate, doubly truncated normal distribution. 
The EI predictions derived with this method consist of the means of those distributions with the 
parameters ψ (  evaluated at their maximum likelihood valuesψ ˆ ( , as follows:  
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where  i U  is the upper bound and  i L  the lower bound.  
Under a Bayesian statistics perspective, a prior distribution  ) (ψ ( p  for the parameters can be used, 
and the predictive distributions in equations 5 and 6 have to be replaced by  ) / ( t b p
J
i  and 
) / ( t b p
J
i
− , respectively.  
King adopted a maximum likelihood function, which is implemented in his and Benoit’s (2003) 
programs EI and EzI. Five intermediate parameters are estimated (i.e. two means, two standard 
deviations and a correlation that makes the vector ψ ( ). The parameters are then transformed and 
rescaled. Values of these parameters are drawn from the posterior distributions using importance 
sampling. The means of the distributions of 
J
i β  and 
J
i
− β  are used as point estimates, and stan-
dard errors are based upon the variation in the simulated values. This is the intuition. See section 
III of King (1997) for a complete description of the method.  33 
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